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Abstract
In this paper, we reassessed labor-market adjustment by using an indicator of occupational
income unfairness (OIU) which shows whether workers are paid equal to what is warranted by their
eort. Although an empirically derived unfairness indicator does not necessarily reect workers'
perceived unfairness, OIU in some occupations indicates the existence of a labor-market adjustment
mechanism. However, unfairness remains in some occupations, perhaps because it is caused by
structural development problems.
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature documenting rising income inequality in most developed countries since
the 1980s. The main explanation for this phenomenon is that the demand for skills has outgrown the
supply of high-skilled workers to increase the skills premium (surveyed by Katz and Autor (1999)).
Although, according to classical economic theory, the labor market adjusts to reduce such income
inequality in the long run, this mechanism does not seem to be working. On the demand side, the
skills-biased technical change (SBTC) hypothesis helps to explain the failure of this adjustment
mechanism (surveyed by Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). The question on the supply side is why has
growth in the supply of high-skilled labor been so slow?
We reassess the adjustment mechanism of the labor market. We investigate whether workers'
occupational choices are based on trading o rewards against eort requirements. Clearly, because
high-income occupations require much eort in the form of high education, training, or long hours,
some workers may avoid such occupations. These criteria for occupational choice relate to a strand
of modern political philosophy known as responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism theory. From the
point of view of this philosophy, persistent income inequality is not necessarily a problem: it
arises from dierences in workers' eort levels, which can be acceptable. If workers base their
occupational choices on such criteria, the labor market cannot eliminate income inequality in the
long run. However, the labor market may be able to reduce income inequality by another means.
Occupations that pay more than what is warranted based on worker eort will attract many job
applicants. Then, workers may be paid equal to what is warranted by their eort. In recent studies,
empirical methods have been developed to determine fair incomes. Following the empirical method
developed by Almas et al. (2011), we derive individual workers' fair incomes, and dene \income
unfairness" as the ratio of actual income to fair income. Then, we aggregate these levels of income
unfairness by occupational group. Our interest is whether the income unfairness levels of each
occupational group have strayed from zero in the long run. We use United States labor statistics
from 1988 to 2015.
We nd that workers in occupational groups such as professionals, sales, and production are
rewarded based on income unfairness ratios. For these occupations, the ratio has hardly strayed
from zero over the past 27 years. However, for other occupational groups, the adjustment of labor
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supply does not work. Workers in managerial occupations have received way more than their fair
income, whereas oce workers and those in service occupations have received much less. We also
nd that workers' average educational level and average age play a central role in whether unfairness
levels strayed from zero.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the empirical method used to
calculate a fair income and the income unfairness indicator. In Section 3, we explain the data
source and present an occupational classication. In Section 4, we describe the empirical results
and their implications. In Section 5, we discuss the relationship between income unfairness and
recent labor-market issues such as job polarization and globalization. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Method
2.1 Fair Income
In this section, we show how the fair income of each worker can be calculated. We suppose that
there are N = f1;    ; ng workers in the economy and that worker i is characterized by a vector
of response variables xRi and nonresponse variables x
NR
i . We assume that pretax income yi is
determined by the following function:
yi = f(x
R
i ; x
NR
i ):
We estimate this income function by using cross-sectional data on workers. We use a linear model
of the logarithm of labor income:
ln yi = x
R
i + x
NR
i + i:
Thus, the income function can be rewritten as:
yi = exp(x
R
i ) exp(x
NR
i + i):
The next step is to construct a worker's claim for redistribution. We apply the generalized
proportionality principle developed by Cappelen and Tungodden (2010). The worker's claim for
redistribution depends only on each worker's response factors. We dene the worker's claim for
redistribution as g(xRi ; ), and calculate it as follows:
g(xRi ; ) =
1
n
X
j
f(xRi ; x
NR
j ) =
1
n
exp(xRi )
X
j
exp(xNRj + j):
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Then, we derive the fair income of each worker by sharing the total pretax income in the economy
by using the worker's claim for redistribution. Letting zi be the fair income of worker i and letting
Y be total pretax income in the economy means that zi can be calculated as:
zi =
g(xRi ; )P
j g(x
R
j ; )
Y:
2.2 Income Inequality and Income Unfairness
In this section, we dene two types of income deviation indicators: income inequality and income
unfairness. Income inequality is dened as ei = yi=y   1, where y is average aggregate income.
It measures the percentage deviation of worker i's income from the average income. For example,
ei = 0:2 means that worker i receives 20% more than the average income. Income unfairness is
dened as ui = yi=zi   1. It measures the percentage deviation of worker i's income from his or
her fair income. ui =  0:1 means that worker i receives 10 % less than his or her fair income.
We also dene two types of aggregate income deviation indicator for each occupational group:
occupational income inequality (OII) and occupational income unfairness (OIU). The former is
dened as the average of each worker's income inequality ei conditional on their occupational
group. It simply measures the percentage deviation of an occupational average income from average
aggregate income. Similarly, OIU is dened as the average of each worker's income unfairness ui
conditional on their occupational group. In this paper, OIU is an important indicator because
it measures how attractive the occupation is. In an occupation with a high OIU, payment is
disproportionately high based on workers' eort.
3 Data
3.1 Data Source
The data used for our research are from the March samples of the Current Population Survey (CPS)
for 1988 to 2015. The dependent variable is the log of individual earnings, and the independent
variables are gender, age, race, educational level, work hours, and dummy variables for public-sector
employment and metropolitan residence. We include in the sample only persons aged 20 to 60 with
an annual income of between 10,000 and 1,000,000 dollars, who worked from 20 to 99 hours per
week for between and 30 and 52 weeks per year, and had at least nine years of education.
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3.2 Occupational Classication
We classify the occupations into six groups: management, professional, service, sales, oce work,
and production. Because the occupational classication of the CPS changed occasionally over the
period under study, we carefully categorize the occupations to minimize the impact of these changes.
The occupational classication used in this paper is shown below.1
1990 Occupational groups
Management Executive, administrative, and managerial
Professional Professional specialty
Technicians and related support
Service Service occupations
Sales Sales occupations
Oce Administrative support, including clerical
Production Precision production, craft, and repair
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers
Machine operators, assemblers, and inspectors
Table 1: Occupational Classication (1988{2001)
1We also dened an occupational group for workers in transportation, but because this category had few workers, we
omitted it from the paper.
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2002 Occupational groups
Management Management, business, and nancial operations
Professional Professional and related occupations
Service Service occupations
Sales Sales and related occupations
Oce Oce and administrative support occupations
Production Construction and extraction occupations
Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations
Production occupations
Table 2: Occupational Classication (2002{2015)
4 Results
4.1 The Evolution of Income Inequality and Income Unfairness
In this section, we report the empirical results, focusing on the evolution of OII and OIU for each
occupational group. Figure 1 shows the evolution of OII for each occupational group from 1988 to
2015. Management occupations have the highest average income, followed, in order, by professional
occupations, sales occupations, production occupations, oce occupations, and service occupations.
Workers in management occupations receive 30% more than the average income, whereas those in
production occupations receive 20% less and oce workers and those in service occupations both
receive 30% less than the average income. The time-series data show that income inequality has
increased over the past 27 years. In fact, OII in management occupations increased by 10 percentage
points (pp). By contrast, in the other occupations, except for professionals, it decreased by between
10 and 20 pp. In 1988, OII diered by 50 pp between the highest- and lowest-ranked occupational
groups, but by 2015, this dierence had increased to 80 pp.
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Figure 1: OII
Figure 2 shows the evolution of OIU, which diers from that of OII. Although professional,
sales, and production occupations have dierent average incomes, their OIU values have remained
around zero. Whereas the OII values for sales and production declined by at least 10 pp in the last
27 years, their OIU values hardly changed. The 15% more than their fair income that workers in
management occupations received in 1988 had become 25% more by the late 2000s. Oce workers
and those in service occupations received 20% less than their fair income. These results suggest
that OIU may inuence workers' occupational choice. We consider this relationship in the next
section.
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Figure 2: OIU
4.2 The Intuition Behind OIU
Why has OIU in some occupational groups stayed around zero in the long run? We suggest three
reasons for changing the value of OIU. First, an occupational group in which average income
increases, other things being equal, experiences an increase in its OIU. An example is management,
in which average incomes have increased over the past 27 years.
Second, changes in occupational groups' response variables such as average educational levels
and average working hours can aect their OIU. Although average incomes in sales occupations
declined by 10 pp from 1988 to 2015, OIU in sales hardly decreased. This is because the average
educational level of sales workers declined over the same period: in 1988, sales workers averaged
0.09 more years of education than workers overall but by 2015, they had 0.51 fewer years than
workers in general.
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Third, changes in occupational groups' nonresponse variables such as workers' average age and
the proportion of women workers can aect their OIU. There is a technical reason for this. When
we calculate the fair income of each worker, the eect of their age is distributed over the whole
economy. Because older workers typically earn higher incomes, their fair income tends to be low.
Therefore, occupational groups in which average age increases experience an increase in their OIU.
Intuitively, young workers do not enter unattractive occupations (which have a low OIU value). As
a result, the average age of workers in these occupations increases, and this raises their OIU. For
example, although average incomes in production occupations changed little from 2002 to 2015,
their OIU increased rapidly. This is because the average age of production workers increased during
this period. In fact, between 2002 and 2015, the average age of production workers increased from
being one year below the average for all workers to being 0.34 years below. This reects the lack
of new entrants in these occupations.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the relationship between our research and recent labor-market issues.
Consider rst the phenomenon known as job polarization. Job polarization refers to a shift from
middle-skilled occupations toward high-skilled and low-skilled occupations. Autor, Levy, and Mur-
nane (2003) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) show that the United States has been experienc-
ing job polarization since the 1980s. Goos and Manning (2007) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons
(2009) document job polarization in Europe. In our occupational classication, the middle-skilled
occupations are sales, oce workers, and production occupations, and average incomes in these oc-
cupations have declined. This has led to workers aging in these occupations: according to our data,
the average age of middle-skilled occupations has increased over the past 27 years. By contrast, the
average age of workers in service occupations (which are low skilled) has declined sharply. Autor
and Dorn (2013) point out that recently, computers have taken over the routine tasks of low-skilled
workers, who have consequently transferred to service occupations. This is why OIU in service
occupations remains low.
Second, we consider why OIU in management occupations remains so high. The theory of
Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2012) predicts that openness raises the fraction of managerial jobs in a
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high-skill economy. The theory indicates that there is a large demand for management workers
in the United States and other developed countries. This may explain the evolution of OIU in
management occupations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we reassessed labor-market adjustment by using an indicator of occupational income
unfairness (OIU). Although an empirically derived unfairness indicator does not necessarily reect
workers' perceived unfairness, OIU in some occupations indicates the existence of a labor-market
adjustment mechanism. However, unfairness remains in some occupations, perhaps because it is
caused by structural development problems.
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